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THE RIGHT OF A MAJORITY IN A CHURCH TO CHANGE ITS DOCTRINE
AND RETAIN PROPERTY AGAINST A DISSENTIENT MINORITY.
The case of the Free Church of Scotland (Bannatyne v.
Overtoun [i9o4] App. C. 515-764) decides that a majority in a
church assembly cannot sacrifice a tenet of the church (in this
case the belief that it should be established by the state),* for
the purpose of paving the way to join with another church.
The case, both because of the immense property involved, and
the intricacy of the question, has aroused considerable interest
even in this country, and it has been suggested that a similar
judgment would not be rendered in the United States.
In Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679-a similar case in an
American Presbytery-Mr. Justice Miller classifies the situa-
tions under which the civil courts are called upon to adjudicate
property rights in religious controversies as follows:
i. Where property has been expressly devoted to the teach-
ing, support or spread of some specific form of religious doc-
trine or belief.
2. Where property is held by a congregation which by the
nature of its organization, is strictly independent of other
ecclesiastical associations, and as to its church government
owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority.
* This point was the common ground of the five judges who formed the
majority of the Court, though some, especially the Lord Chancellor, pre-
sented auxiliary reasons.
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3. Where the property is held by a congregatioq or ecclesi-
astical body which is but a subordinate member of some general
church organization, in wlich there are superior ecclesiastical
tribunals, with a general power of control.
The first division needed and needs no extended discussion-
religious organizations come before the court in much the same
aspect as any voluntary association. Its rights of property and
the actions of its members are subject to the same restraints.
So that although the acceptance of gifts under expressed condi-
tions has, time after time, owing to change in the general
religious attitude, had the effect of vitiating the influence of
the donees, as is the present condition of the Andover Theo-
logical Seminary-or of greatly hampering their natural
growth-of which the retarded principles of some of the theo-
logical seminaries in our best universities bear witness-never-
theless there can be no option in applying the specific trust.
See Attorney-General v. Pearson, 3 Meriv. 353.
The second class of cases has grown considerably in impor-
tance in this country of late years. Since, and before, Justice
Miller's opinion it has been held that any property given to an
independent organization cannot be presumed to be devoted to
the inculcation of the beliefs which happen to be held by the
church at the time of the donation. Baptist Church v. Fort, 93
Tex. 215; Hendrickson v. Shotwell, , N. J. Eq. 577. Indeed,
the presumption might more naturally be that the donors-
often not even of the same denomination as the church to which
they give-are actuated rather by the purpose of advancing
religious belief than of promulgating a strict creed. In these
6hurches the vote of the majority governs the creed, doctrine
and management of the church. Keyser v. Stanisfer, 6 0. 363.
The right thus to change accrues only to independent congre-
gations, though some connection with synods and assemblies,
such as sending delegates or forming a weak federation in the
nature of a synod, is allowable. Landis' Appeal, io2 Pa. 464.
This right seems to be purchased at the cost of extreme diffi-
culty in federations, such as the Congregational associations,
being able to become beneficiaries.
As to the third class, of which the Free Church case is an
example, the American view opposes the House of Lords.
Justice Miller justifies his renunciation on the ground that even
the Scotch "Free" Church is not free in the American sense,
and was still less so at the time when English precedent grew
up, being greatly hampered by statute.* His suggestion,
moreover, that the tribunals and assemblies of the church are
more fitted through their special learning to grapple with
questions of doctrine, seems justified by the bewildered ques-
tions and expressions of the Law Lords in the Free Church
case-expressions which wrung from the counsel for the
* For a full record of the cases under which the English doctrine grew up,
see Shaw's Reports of Cases in the Court of Sessions.
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appellees the aggrieved exclamation, "But, my lords, we are
dealing with a subject which requires learning!" American
courts hold the decisions of the religious judicatory conclusive,
even respecting property rights. Church v. Halvorsen, 42
Minn. 503.
There has been no call to the United States courts to adjudi-
cate questions involving so vast an amount of property as in
the Free Church case-most of our decisions being anent the
retention of his salary by some unwelcome incumbent, or the
possession of some isolated church. Certainly the American
view is not so likely to produce the lamentable results present
in the decision of the English courts, nor to necessitate the
appointment of an ex postfacto legislative committee, as has
that case.
It is not a pleasant task for our courts of law to be forced to
examine intangible and indistinct questions of theology, and
they will, as the court remarked in Mason v. Muncaster, 9 Wheat.
445, "examine into proceedings of religious bodies with
indulgence, and will suppose their proceedings to be in con-
formity with existing rights."
THE TREND OF DECISIONS UNDER THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT.
That vast and varied interests militate for the centralization
of the Government of the United States is indisputable. The
adaptation of the Federal Constitution to meet the exigencies
of territory newly acquired; the ever-enduring construction of
the implied powers of Congress; the application of the Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act in the Northern Securities and other decis-
ions-these are some of the influences which, to many, threaten
to render abortive the finely balanced division of powers
devised by the framers of the Constitution, and which recall
the admonition: "In proportion as the General Government
encroaches upon the rights of the states, in the same proportion
does it impair its own power and detract from its ability to
fulfill the purposes of its creation."
Of a more serious import, however, than the adjudications
of the Supreme Court is the recommendation recently made by
the Commissioner of Corporations. This report urges federal
license or incorporation-perferably license-of corporations
engaged in interstate commerce. Presumably its purport is to
enable the general government to regulate practically all of the
large corporations of the country. This is indicated by the
suggestion that the insurance business under present condi-
tions is interstate commerce and as such should be brought
under federal control, and this notwithstanding that the
courts, commencing with Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, have
uniformly held that insurance is not interstate commerce.
That such legislation would be a long stride in the growth of
paternalism is manifest. That such legislation is favorably
regarded by many is equally manifest by the report made by
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the committee on Commercial Law at the last meeting of the
American Bar Association, which took the position that the
Sherman Act had reached the limit of its usefulness, and
recommended legislation substantially along these lines.
In view of these conditions, we read with interest the recent
case of Swif & Co. v. United States, 25 Sup. Ct. 276, rendered
by a unanimous court, which may be regarded as a potent
factor in the crystallization of the law under the Sherman
Act, and which is a striking illustration, not only of the poten-
tialities of that act, but of the desire of the justices for an
efficacious enforcement of its provisions. The defendants in
this case, composed of dealers handling a dominant proportion
of fresh meats throughout the United States, formed a com-
bination, unaccompanied by a fusion of property interests, the
object and result of which was (i) to prevent competitive
bidding in the purchase of live stock transported from the
states of its origin and held for sale by the owners at various
stockyards, and (2) to fix and maintain prices in the sale of
meat thoughout the country. The Court held that the purchase
of live stock under the conditions named constitutes interstate
commerce-a point never before adjudicated-and that the
general purpose of the agreement brought it within the prohi-
bition of the Sherman Act.
A brief survey of the cases under the Sherman Act will be
of assistance in considering the present decision. The first of
these is United States v. Knight, 156 U. S. i, where it was the
opinion of a majority of the Court that a combination to pur-
chase refineries throughout the United States, involving a
fusion of property interests is not a restraint of trade, as the
products of such refineries might never enter into the channels
of interstate commerce. Little stress was laid upon the pur-
pose to monopolize the sale, as it was regarded as merely an
incident to the manufacture. United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Association, i66 U. S. 29o, and United States v. Joint
Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505, held that the act applies to
railroads and contained dicta to the effect that it prohibits all
agreements in restraint of interstate commerce, whether
reasonable or unreasonable. In Hopkins v. United States 171
U. S. 578, and Anderson v. United States, i7I U. S 604, it was
held that the act is not violated by an agreement among persons
engaged, not in interstate commerce, but in furnishing merely
a local aid and facility to commerce. Then the important case
of Addyston Pi.pe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 2 i,
was decided, holding that a combination among formerly
competing factories, accompanied by a division of territory,
which restrained the sale as well as the manufacture of a com-
modity among the several states, is prohibited. Montague &
Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, held that an agreement between
manufacturers and dealers. in different states, whereby the
prices of articles are fixed and controlled, is illegal. Following
this Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. I97,
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decided that an agreement between two parallel and competing
railroads engaged in interstate commerce, whereby the control
of both was given to a holding company organized for the
purpose, thus destroying all motive for competition, is pro-
hibited by the act.
Of the decisions enumerated above, two especially may be
compared, with the present-the Knight and Hopkins cases.
While Justice Holmes, who wrote the opinion in the instant
case, remarked that the line of demarcation between this and
the Knight Case was finely drawn, there are two distinctions
worthy of mention: (i) In the Knight Case the subject matter
of the combination was manufacture. It is true that monopoly
of commerce among the states in the article manufactured
might follow from the agreement, but it was not a necessary
consequence. In the present case the subject matter was sales
and the primary purpose of the combination was to restrain
and monopolize commerce among the states in respect to such
sales. (2) In the the Knight Case combination was effected by
the acquisition of property rights and the consequent fusion of
competing properties; whereas here the agreement did not
accomplish any acquisition by any of the defendants of property
rights in the business of the others. In this respect therefore
the instant case may also be distinguished from the Northern
Securities decision. The Knight Case was in effect modified by
the Addyston Pipe decision; and in view of the Northern Securi-
ties Case, which involved an indirect restraint only, it would seem
perhaps that the Knight Case would receive a different con-
struction were it now to come before the court for the first
time. While the dissentient opinions in the Northern Securities
Case. in connection with Justice Brewer's statement, indicate
that- the court no longer adheres to the dictum in the Freight
Association Case that the act prohibits all agreements in restaint
of interstate commerce, whether reasonable or unreasonable-
thus making the criterion of reasonableness the same as at
common law-this position capnot be said to decrease the
efficacy of the act, inasmuch as no combination has been
declared illegal under its provisions which could not have been
reached by an application of common law principles.
Again, the agreements between the defendants did not relate
to a subject collateral or incidental to commerce or to anything
that may be considered an instrumentality of commerce. They
were made by persons engaged themselves in interstate com-
merce and in respect to the conduct of commerce itself. There-
fore the case may be differentiated from the Hopkins Case. when
the court deemed those in the combination to be engaged, not
in commerce, but in furnishing merely a local aid and facility
to commerce.
It is patent that there is a marked tendency on the part of
the Supreme Court to broaden the significance of the term
"'interstate commerce" and to enlarge the scope of the Sherman
Act, even at the expense of invading the domain of States'
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Rights; this tendency being noticeable in the Addfston Pipe
Case and especially so in the Northern Securities Case- In view,
then, of the present construction of the Sherman Act and the
increasing proof that the common law, even in the absence of
statutory enactment, is sufficient, if manfully invoked, to pro-
tect the rights of individuals, may not those who favor local
autonomy well ask that pause be given to additional repressive
legislation in so far as it makes the Federal Government the
depository of powers formerly residing in the states?
THE RIGHTS AND POWERS OF TELEGRAPH COMPANIES UNDER THE
ACT OF I866.
In the case of W. U. Tel. Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 25 Sup. Ct. 133,
recently decided by the United States Supreme Court, a
definite, and probably final, interpretation has been put upon
the act of Congress of z866 relating to telegraph companies.
Questions as to the rights and powers of telegraph companies
have arisen a number of times under the following portion of
the act: "That any telegraph company now organized under
the laws of any State in this Union, shall have the right to
construct, maintain and operate lines of telegraph through and
over any portion of the public domain of the United States,
over and along any of the military or post roads of the United
States which have been or may hereafter be declared such by
act of Congress, and over, under or across the navigable
streams or waters of the United States: provided, it does not
interfere with ordinary travel on such military or post road."
14 Stat. at L. 22x. By other acts, Congress declared all railroads
post roads. Stat. at L. 5-271, I0-255, 17-283. Under these
acts the telegraph company claimed the right to maintain its
lines upon the right of way of the Pennsylvania Railroad Co.
after the contract under which it came upon the company's
property had expired. It maintained that the act gave a power
equal to that of eminent domain, under the exercise of which it
might.remain upon the railroad's property as long as it did not
interfere with ordinary travel. The railroad successfully con-
tended that the act was merely declaratory of the interstate
nature of the telegraph business, and intended only to prevent
state interference.
In Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. I, the Court
decided adversely to the existehce of the right of eminent
domain under the act. This decision was reaffirmed in W. U.
Tel. Co. v. Ann Arbor R. Co., 178 U. S.% 239. In the Pensacola
case the Court stated the fundamental idea and sole purpose of
the statute to he the prohibiting of all state monopolies in com-
mercial intercourse by telegraph, adding that the act gives no
foreign corporation the right to enter upon private property
without the consent of the owner; that whenever the consent of
the owner is obtained, no state legislature shall prevent the
occupation of post roads for telegraph purposes, by such cor-
porations as are willing to avail themselves of its privileges.
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Under the act there is no provision for condemnation pro-
ceedings nor for compensations. As stated in the Pensacola
case, supra, "If private property is required it must, so far as
the present legislation is concerned, be obtained by private
arrangement with its owner. No compulsory proceedings are
authorized." Tel. Co. v. Cleveland L. R. Co., 94 Fed. 234. In
Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 399, it is said that it is a condition
precedent to the exercise of the power of eminent domain that
the statute make provision for reasonable compensation to the
owner. Cherokee Nation v. So. Kan. R. Co., 135 U. S. 641;
Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S. 367.
Postal Tel. Co. v. Ore. S. L. Co., 104 Fed. 623, and P. Tel.
Co. v. R. Co., 314 Fed. 787. appear to support the telegraph
company's contention, but they were so influenced by state
statutes that they have but little weight. And in P. Tel. Co.
v. So. R?. Co., 89 Fed. x9o, it was said that while the Act of
x866 gave the right to build on all post roads, yet the laws of
North Carolina governed the method of exercising that right.
However, in St. P. R. Co. v. Tel. Co.., Ii8 Fed. 497, the Court,
where the telegraph company came upon the right of way with
the consent of the owners, declined to compel it to remove,
especially since it appeared that no express agreement for
removal had been made when the lines were erected. It would
also seem that Osborn Co. v. 141o. P. R. Co., 147 U. S. 248, and
Elroy v. Kan. City, 21 Fed. 257, support the proposition that
where a court has general jurisdiction it may find a means of
enforcing the right of eminent domain even though no pro-
vision has been made for compensation.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan, in W. U. Tel.
Co. v. Penn. R. Co., supra, much force is placed upon Kohl v.U. S., supra, but in that case the power to condemn was given.
It is also maintained that the Pensacola and Ann Arbor cases
are mere dicta and not binding upon the courts. It must be
admitted that, though the power granted by the Act of 1866
was discussed and passed upon, it was not directly in issue.
Justice Brewer expressed the opinion that Justice Harlan's
view was correct in theory but considered the Pensacola and
Ann Arbor cases binding.
